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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Mark Graham ("Graham") argues that staff time can be charged to a 
requester of records under GRAMA only if staff is employed in reformatting the 
records into media other than how they are kept by the governmental entity (e.g., paper 
to computer disk or laser disk). Under his interpretation, government staff could be 
diverted from their normal duties and spend hundreds, if not thousands, of hours 
compiling records for inspection by a requester, but if the records are kept in paper 
format by the government and requested to be compiled in paper format for the 
requester, no staff time charges could be made. 
This result cannot be what the Utah Legislature intended. If Graham is 
right, environmental activists, like himself, and others who oppose the District's1 solid 
waste operations for one reason or another could literally pummel the District with 
far-reaching requests for records under GRAMA and bring District operations to a halt. 
They would avoid paying staff time costs by simply requesting that the records be 
produced in the same media maintained by the District. The same could also happen to 
state agencies that are subject to GRAMA's provisions. Government could be brought 
to its knees. Graham is wrong, and the Court should affirm the trial court's recognition 
1
 The "District" means collectively defendants, appellees, and 
cross-appellants Davis County Solid Waste Management and Energy Recovery Special 
Service District, the District's Administrative Control Board, and LeGrand Bitter, the 
District's Executive Director. 
1 
that Graham's arguments are "nonsensical" and "could only with great difficulty be 
seriously argued." R. 253. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1998). The Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction over the appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1998), and that court transferred the case to 
this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (1998). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW2 
1. Did the substitution of Graham as plaintiff simply commence an 
entirely new, but at that point untimely, appeal from an administrative action of the 
District where the original complaint was void because it was filed by an 
unincorporated committee representing itself pro se, which committee was prohibited 
from access to Utah's courts for failure to comply with the Utah Assumed Name 
Statute? 
This issue was raised by the District in its Motion to Dismiss or for 
Summary Judgment, R. 46-47, and in its Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs 
Motion to File an Amended Complaint and in Support of Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss or for Summary Judgment. R. 49-63. The trial court ruled in Graham's favor 
2
 The District notes that Graham does not set forth in his Issues Presented 
for Review where each issue was preserved in the trial court. 
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on this issue and allowed him to be substituted as plaintiff, with the substitution relating 
back to the date of the filing of the original complaint. R. 144-53. 
This is an issue of law that is reviewed for correctness. Drake v. 
Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997). 
2. Does the Utah Government Records Access and Management Act, 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-101, et seq. (1997) ("GRAMA"), allow a governmental entity 
to charge fees for staff time incurred filling a records request only when the requester 
asks that the records be put in an entirely different format than the records are 
maintained by the governmental entity, thereby allowing a requester to completely 
avoid staff time charges, no matter how much time may be required to fill the request, 
by simply requesting that records be produced in the same format as maintained by the 
entity? 
The trial court ruled in the District's favor on this issue. R. 245-53. It is 
an issue of law that is reviewed for correctness. Drake v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 
939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997). 
3. If Graham prevails on this appeal, should he be awarded attorney 
fees under GRAMA even though the District's decision concerning the staff time 
charges at issue had a reasonable basis as demonstrated by the trial court's carefully 
reasoned opinion in the District's favor, even though factual issues would need to be 
resolved before an award of attorney fees could be made, and even though claims for 
3 
attorney fees are subject to the procedural requirements of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act? 
Because the trial court ruled in the District's favor, it did not award 
Graham any attorney fees. R. 253. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY AND LEGAL PROVISIONS 
Copies of the following determinative statutory and legal provisions are 
reproduced in Addendum A, except the District's Ordinance No. 92-C, which is 
reproduced in Addendum B: 
Utah Code Ann. § 42-2-5 (1997) 
Utah Code Ann. § 42-2-10 (1997) 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-201(1) (1997) 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-2-203(2), (7) and (8) (1997) 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-802 (1997) 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-40 (1997) 
Utah R. Civ. P. 15(c) 
UtahR. Civ. P. 17(a) 
The District's Ordinance No. 92-C 
4 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition in 
the Trial Court, 
Graham seeks review of an order of the trial court dismissing an appeal 
from an administrative decision under GRAMA made by the District's Administrative 
Control Board. R. 245-53. Graham, as a member and on behalf of an unincorporated 
committee called the Residents of Davis County Clear Air Committee (the "Clear Air 
Committee"), sought to inspect certain records maintained by the District. R. 23. The 
District refused to allow the Clear Air Committee to review the records prior to 
payment of a nominal amount to cover 14 hours of staff time incurred by District staff 
retrieving and compiling the records. R. 24, 27, 28, 32-33. The District's 
Administrative Control Board affirmed the District's executive director's decision on 
this issue. R. 34. 
The Clear Air Committee, representing itself pro se through Graham, 
who is not a licensed attorney, filed a complaint in the trial court appealing the 
District's decision. R. 1-34. The District moved to dismiss because, among other 
reasons, the Clear Air Committee had not registered its assumed name with the Utah 
Division of Corporations and Commercial Code, and because the Clear Air Committee 
cannot represent itself in court pro se. R. 46-47. Graham moved to "amend" the 
5 
complaint by substituting himself as plaintiff. R. 114-15. The trial court granted 
Graham's motion to amend and denied the District's motion to dismiss. R. 144-53. 
Thereafter, Graham filed a motion for summary judgment on the merits, 
and the District filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. R. 159-73, 174-200. On 
April 6, 1998, the trial court granted the District's cross-motion for summary judgment 
in a nine-page decision. R. 245-53. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
Graham is an individual who is also a member of the Clear Air 
Committee. R. 146. The Clear Air Committee is allegedly "a non-profit organization 
dedicated to minimizing air pollution in Davis County." R. 1. Graham is not licensed 
to practice law in Utah. R. 146. Graham is only one of several members of the Clear 
Air Committee, as evidenced by correspondence to the District from the Committee 
signed by several individuals. R. 67. 
Defendant Davis County Solid Waste Management and Energy Recovery 
Special Service District is a political subdivision of the state of Utah and a 
"governmental entity" pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-103(9) (1997). R. 245. 
Defendant Administrative Control Board is the governing body of the district and has 
the legal authority to make determinations regarding public access to records in the 
district's offices and agencies. The Administrative Control Board is also a 
"governmental entity" pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-103(9) (1997). R. 246. 
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Defendant LeGrand Bitter is the Executive Director of the district. The Executive 
Director's office is a "governmental entity" pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-103(9) 
(1997). Id. 
In February and April of 1997, the District performed initial compliance 
testing as required by Condition No. 8 of Approval Order Number DAQE-850-96 dated 
September 10, 1996 ("Approval Order") issued by the State of Utah Department of 
Environmental Quality, Division of Air Quality. Id. On April 28, 1997, Graham, on 
behalf of the Clear Air Committee, submitted a written request to the District pursuant 
to GRAMA seeking to inspect and copy certain government records related to the 
District's February and April 1997 air emissions stack testing. R. 3, 23, 246. 
The request asked for: 
1. The current contract(s) between the Special 
Service District and Dr. H. Gregor Rigo and/or his firm, 
Rigo & Rigo Associates; 
2. Records relating to the stack test(s) conducted 
during January and/or February, 1997, namely: 
a. samples taken, journals, personal field notes, 
and inspection logs 
b. laboratory analysis of air samples taken 
c. any correspondence between the District and 
the entities responsible for gathering and/or 
analyzing and evaluating the air samples 
subsequent to the date of sampling 
7 
d. memos or internal documents (within the 
Special Service District) relating to the stack test 
or the laboratory analysis 
e. any deviation or departure from the prescribed methods for 
gathering samples and their reason(s), or problems encountered 
during the sample gathering process 
R. 23, 246-47. 
In response, the District provided some of the requested records. R. 3, 
24, 247. The District also informed Graham that other documents the Clear Air 
Committee requested, amounting to hundreds of pages of unbound documents, would 
be made available after payment of $280, based on 14 hours of staff time necessary to 
retrieve and compile the documents. R. 3, 28, 247. 
Because of the variety of records involved in accommodating the Clear 
Air Committee's request, the District could not and did not store them in one 
document, computer program, or central file. The District had to take files, 
documents, and data from several sources and organize them in order to respond to the 
request. The District made a thorough search of all files and records related to the 
testing to ensure that the District produced everything relevant. R. 240, 248. 
To do so, it was necessary for the District to contact those people who 
may have been involved in the testing at issue and obtain their assistance. John 
Watson, Bart Baker, certain operators and maintenance personnel, and Jack Schmidt 
searched, retrieved, and compiled the records requested by the Clear Air Committee. 
8 
Collectively, they spent a total of 14 hours. The District retrieved and compiled 
information from District files located at individual employees' work stations, 
day timers, operator logs, testing protocols, general District files that may relate to 
testing, and a computer database. Research on the computer database was a time-
consuming process. The database is continually updated, and after a period of time, 
information stored in the database is downloaded to tape. Some of the information the 
Clear Air Committee requested had been stored on tape, requiring an operator to peruse 
the computer and tapes to locate and print hard copies of the information requested. 
R. 240-41,248. 
In compliance with GRAMA and the District's GRAMA Ordinance {see 
Addendum B, Ordinance No. 92-C), the District does not charge for time incurred in 
reviewing the records to determine whether they are private, controlled, or protected 
under GRAMA, although a review of the records the Clear Air Committee requested 
was made to make such a determination. Staff time charges assessed by the District on 
the Clear Air Committee's records request were based on the Ordinance, but were less 
than actual cost because employees who reviewed files to find the requested records are 
paid more than $20 per hour. R. 241-42, 248-49. 
On or about June 9, 1997, Graham appealed to the District's Executive 
Director the decision to charge $20 per hour for staff time. R. 3, 29-31, 247. 
Graham's appeal to the District's Executive Director was denied. Graham was also 
9 
informed of the right to appeal the Executive Director's decision to the District's 
Administrative Control Board. R. 4, 32-33, 247. 
On July 2, 1997, Graham appeared before the Administrative Control 
Board to appeal the Executive Director's decision. R. 247. At this hearing, he made it 
clear that he was appearing on behalf of the Clear Air Committee. R. 4, 82. By letter 
dated July 3, 1997, the Board notified Graham that it denied the Clear Air Committee's 
appeal by a unanimous vote of its members. The Board found that "[t]he evidence 
presented to the Board demonstrated that significant time had been incurred by staff to 
retrieve and compile the records you seek to review. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 63-2-203(2)(a) and (b), and Ordinance No. 92-C, section 10, of the District, the 
Executive Director properly requested that you pay the reasonable cost of staff 
time—14 hours at $20.00 per hour—prior to review of the records." R. 4, 34, 247. On 
July 8, 1997, Graham sent another letter to the District confirming that the appeal to 
the Administrative Control Board had been taken by the Clear Air Committee. R. 91. 
On July 30, 1997, the Clear Air Committee filed this lawsuit appealing 
the Administrative Control Board's decision. R. 1,6, 247. The Clear Air Committee 
filed it purporting to represent itself pro se through Graham. R. 1,6. As of that date, 
the Clear Air Committee had not registered its name with the Utah Division of 
Corporations and Commercial Code. R. 93-96. 
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On September 19, 1997, Graham, who was not a party, moved the trial 
court for an order allowing him to "amend" the complaint to substitute himself, 
individually, for the Clear Air Committee as the named party plaintiff. R. 114-15. The 
District opposed the motion and filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, 
arguing that because Graham was not licensed as an attorney and because the Clear Air 
Committee had not properly registered its name pursuant to the Assumed Name Statute, 
the filing of the complaint was void. Substituting Graham as the plaintiff would 
constitute the initiation of a new action that would be untimely. R. 46-113. 
On November 18, 1997, the trial court entered a memorandum decision 
granting Graham's motion to be substituted as the plaintiff in this action and denied the 
District's motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. R. 144-53. A copy of this 
ruling is attached as Addendum C. The trial court ruled that although the District was 
correct that Graham could not represent the Clear Air Committee pro se, his filing of 
the complaint on behalf of the Clear Air Committee was not void ab initio. Allowing 
Graham to substitute himself as plaintiff would correct that problem. R. 148-49. The 
trial court also ruled that it was not clear that the Clear Air Committee had to comply 
with the provisions of the Utah Assumed Name Statute because the court was "not 
entirely convinced that a community association organized for the purposes of 
monitoring pollution compliance is carrying on, conducting, or transacting business 
such to put it within the purview of" the Assumed Name Statute. R. 149. In any 
11 
event, the trial court believed allowing Graham to be substituted as plaintiff corrected 
the problem. Id. Finally, the trial court believed that there were issues of fact whether 
the Clear Air Committee was the only proper party plaintiff, and it believed, based on 
the evidence before it, that the Clear Air Committee and Graham had sufficient identity 
of interests to allow relation back of the substitution. R. 149-51. 
Thereafter, on January 16, 1998, Graham filed a motion for summary 
judgment on the applicable language of GRAMA. R. 159. The District responded 
with a cross-motion for summary judgment on February 9, 1998. R. 174-75. 
On April 6, 1998, the trial court issued a Ruling on Plaintiffs and 
Defendants' Cross Motions for Summary Judgment. R. 245-53. A copy of this ruling 
is attached as Addendum D. The trial court accepted the District's statement of 
undisputed facts, R. 245 n.l, and noted that the crux of the dispute focused on the 
meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-203(2) (1997). This section provides in relevant 
part: 
(2) When a governmental entity compiles a record in a form 
other than that normally maintained by the governmental 
entity, the actual costs under this section may include the 
following: 
(a) the cost of staff time for summarizing, compiling, 
or tailoring the record either into an organization or 
media to meet the person's request; 
(b) the cost of staff time for search, retrieval, and 
other direct administrative costs for complying with a 
12 
request. The hourly charge may not exceed the salary 
of the lowest paid employee who, in the discretion of 
the custodian of records, has the necessary skill and 
training to perform the request; provided, however, 
that no charge may be made for the first quarter hour 
of staff time; and 
(c) in the case of fees for a record that is the 
result of computer output other than word 
processing, the actual incremental cost of 
providing the electronic services and products 
together with a reasonable portion of the costs 
associated with formatting or interfacing the 
information for particular users, and the 
administrative costs as set forth in Subsections 
(2)(a) and (b). 
R. 250. 
The trial court wrote that "Plaintiffs critical argument revolves around 
the meaning of the words 'compile' and 'form' and their context, in the phrase: 'When 
a governmental entity compiles a record in a form other than that normally maintained 
by the governmental entity, the actual costs under this section may include the 
following: [.]'" R. 250-51. It noted that "Plaintiff argues that the meanings of 
'compile' and 'form' are vague and ambiguous and as such must be construed as 
narrowly as possible, thereby excluding all charges for any records that are already 
maintained by the government agency, and only allowing charges for a record that is 
'transformed' into a different record." R. 251. 
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After stating basic rules of statutory construction, the trial court ruled for 
the District. It held: 
In the Court's opinion, the statute is neither vague 
nor ambiguous, nor is it difficult to construct, given the 
plain meaning of its terms. Defendants provide that 
Webster's New World Dictionary defines "compile" as: "to 
gather and put together (statistics, facts, etc.) in an orderly 
form" and "to compose (a book, etc.) of materials gathered 
from various sources." Webster's defines "form," inter 
alia, as: "the particular mode of existence a thing has or 
takes;" "arrangement, esp. orderly arrangement; way in 
which parts of a whole are organized; pattern; style. . ." 
Plaintiffs request consists of records falling into five 
separate categories (see, Court's Findings of Fact No. 6, 
a-e, supra). Defendants' unrebutted evidence, from the 
affidavit of John K. Schmidt submitted in support of their 
memorandum, shows that 14 hours of staff time was spent in 
responding to plaintiffs request (see, Court's Findings of 
Fact Nos. 17-23, supra). From the facts submitted it is 
quite clear to the Court that the requested fee was incurred 
as a direct result of the District's "summarizing, compiling 
[and] tailoring the record either into an organization or 
media to meet the person's request;" their "search, retrieval, 
and other direct administrative costs for complying with 
[the] request;["] and "the actual incremental cost of 
providing the electronic services and products together with 
a reasonable portion of the costs associated with formatting 
or interfacing the information for particular users, and the 
administrative costs as set forth in Subsections (2)(a) and 
(b)." 
. . . As made clear by defendants, the records were 
kept in neither the form nor the media requested by plaintiff 
and they therefore needed to be "compiled" into that form to 
conform to his requests. 
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The Court finds that the common meaning of the 
terms "compile" and "form" would include the work 
performed by the District. As further support, the context 
of the words within the statute supports this conclusion. 
"Compile" is the only verb in U.C.A. § 63-2-203(2) 
defining what actual costs may be charged for. Therefore, 
as the same section goes on to state "the actual costs under 
this section may include the following . . . ," any of the 
tasks listed at 63-2-203(2)(a) through (c) must, by necessity, 
be encompassed within the term "compile." Any other 
reading of the section would be nonsensical, and, in the 
Court's opinion, could only with great difficulty be 
seriously argued. 
R. 251-53 (bold emphasis added; other emphasis in original). 
Graham timely filed his notice of appeal on May 5, 1998, R. 258-60, and 
the defendants timely filed their notice of cross-appeal from the trial court's denial of 
the District's motion to dismiss on May 19, 1998. R. 272-73. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court should not have reached the merits of this case because it 
lacked jurisdiction. The Clear Air Committee's filing of the original complaint was 
void because it cannot represent pro se and because it is barred from access to the 
courts of Utah for failure to comply with Utah's Assumed Name Statute. Because the 
original complaint was void, Graham's substitution as plaintiff commenced an entirely 
new, but by that time an untimely, appeal from the District's decision. 
If this Court concludes that the trial court had jurisdiction, the trial court's 
decision on the merits should be affirmed in all respects. The District had to spent 14 
15 
hours of staff time compiling the records the Clear Air Committee requested. Due to 
the nature of the requests, the District had to thoroughly review District records and 
computer databases and cull those records requested by the Clear Air Committee. In 
doing so, under the plain meaning of the words "compile" and "form," the District 
compiled the records in a form not normally maintained by the District, but in a form 
specifically requested by the Clear Air Committee. 
Public policy demands such a result. If records requesters only are 
required by GRAMA to pay for staff time incurred filling a records request when the 
requester specifically asks that the records be put in an entirely different format or 
media, requesters could avoid costs, yet needlessly tie up government operations, by 
simply requesting that paper records be produced on paper, computer records on 
computer disks, and so forth. By requiring requesters to pay staff time incurred 
compiling records, as requesters must pay under other public access laws such as the 
Freedom of Information Act, it will encourage requesters to draft their requests 
narrowly to seek only the information they really need and will protect the public 
coffers when a request necessarily requires significant staff time to fill. 
Graham is not entitled to attorney fees and costs because the District's 
position has a reasonable basis. The District's position prevailed in the trial court and 
will prevail on appeal. However, if Graham prevails, attorney fees still are not 
justified because the District had a reasonable basis for its actions. At the very least, a 
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determination of whether Graham is entitled to attorney fees requires a remand to the 
trial court to resolve issues of fact and Graham's compliance with the provisions of the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE CLEAR AIR COMMITTEE'S COMPLAINT WAS VOID WHEN FILED 
AND GRAHAM'S SUBSTITUTION AS PLAINTIFF COMMENCED A 
NEW ACTION THAT WAS NOT TIMELY3 
The Clear Air Committee's original complaint was void when it was filed 
because the Clear Air Committee cannot represent itself in court pro se and because it 
was prohibited from access to the courts for failure to register its assumed name. 
Therefore, an appeal from the Administrative Control Board's decision was never 
perfected within the time period allowed. Because the complaint was void when filed, 
Graham's substitution as plaintiff commenced a new action, but one that was untimely 
and should have been dismissed. 
The Utah Supreme Court has written that "[i]t has long been the law of 
this jurisdiction that a corporate litigant must be represented in court by a licensed 
3
 The District would prefer to have the Court rule on the merits of 
Graham's appeal, but because a serious question exists concerning whether the trial 
court had subject matter jurisdiction the District feels duty-bound to protect the 
integrity of the Court by raising and addressing this issue. 
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attorney." Tracy-Burke Assoc, v. Department of Employment Sec, Industrial Comm'n 
of Utah, 699 P.2d 687, 687 (Utah 1985). 
A corporation is not a natural person. It is an artificial 
entity created by law and as such it can neither practice law 
nor appear or act in person. Out of court it must act in its 
affairs through its agents and representatives and in matters 
in court it can act only through licensed attorneys. A 
corporation cannot appear in court by an officer who is not 
an attorney and it cannot appear in propria persona. 
Id. at 687; accord Turtle v. Hi-Land Dairyman's Ass'n, 350 P.2d 616, 618 (Utah 1960) 
(citing Paradise v. Nowlin, 195 P.2d 867, 867 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948)). Indeed, 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-40 (1996) specifically prohibits both corporations and 
voluntary associations, like the Clear Air Committee, from practicing law.4 
The California Court of Appeals held in Paradise that a notice of appeal 
and an opposition brief filed pro se by a corporation was "void by reason of the 
corporation's lack of power to represent itself in an action in court." 195 P.2d at 867 
(emphasis added). In Tracy-Burke, the Utah Supreme Court relied on Paradise to 
dismiss a petition for a writ of review challenging a decision of the Industrial 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-40 provides in relevant part: 
It shall be unlawful for any corporation or voluntary 
association . . . to hold itself out to the public by 
advertisement or otherwise as being entitled to practice law 
or to furnish attorneys or counselors, or to render legal 
services or advice of any kind in any action or proceeding, 
or to solicit directly or indirectly any claim or demand for 
the purpose of bringing action thereon . . . . 
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Commission because the petition had been filed by the corporation pro se. 699 P.2d at 
687. If the corporation's actions in Tracy-Burke had not been void when filed, the 
actions could have been corrected by the appearance of an attorney for the corporation. 
Yet, the Supreme Court, implying that the filing by the corporation itself could not be 
corrected, dismissed the petition outright rather than instructing the corporation to have 
counsel make an appearance. 
This is significant because the petition in Tracy-Burke was essentially the 
same type of proceeding filed by the Clear Air Committee in this case—it was an appeal 
to a court from a decision of an administrative agency. Graham, as a member of the 
Clear Air Committee, but not a licensed attorney, filed the complaint pro se for the 
Clear Air Committee as an appeal from the Administrative Control Board's decision. 
Because the Clear Air Committee is a voluntary unincorporated association, it cannot 
practice law by itself. Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-40. As such, the filing of the 
complaint was void under Tracy-Burke and Paradise. 
In addition, the complaint filed by the Clear Air Committee was void 
because the Clear Air Committee was barred from access to the trial court for failing to 
comply with the requirements of Utah's Assumed Name Statute, Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 42-2-5 to 42-2-11 (1997). This statute requires that 
[e]very person who carries on, conducts, or transacts 
business in this state under an assumed name, whether that 
business is carried on, conducted, or transacted as an 
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individual, association, partnership, corporation, or 
otherwise, shall file with the Division of Corporations and 
Commercial Code a certificate setting forth: the name under 
which the business is, or is to be carried on . . . . 
Id. § -5 (emphasis added).5 
A penalty barring access to the courts of the state of Utah is imposed on 
those who fail to comply with the Assumed Name Statute. The statute provides that a 
non-complying party "shall not sue, prosecute, or maintain any action, suit, 
counterclaim, cross complaint, or proceeding in any of the courts of this state. . . 
." Id. § -10 (emphasis added); accord Blodgett v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 752 P.2d 901 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). Upon compliance with Utah's Assumed Name Statute, this 
penalty may be removed. WallInv. Co. v. Garden GateDistrib., Inc., 593 P.2d 542 
(Utah 1979). 
Here, the Clear Air Committee failed to file an assumed name registration 
with the Utah Department of Commerce, Division of Corporations and Commercial 
Code prior to filing suit. R. 93-96. It also did not correct that failure prior to the 
5
 There is some question whether the Clear Air Committee could even 
register its name with the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code. The full 
name of the Clear Air Committee is "Residents of Davis County Clear Air 
Committee." Utah Code Ann. § 42-2-6.6(6) (1997) provides that "[a] name that 
implies by any word in the name that it is an agency of the state or of any of its 
political subdivisions, if it is not actually such a legally established agency, may not be 
approved for filing by the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code." Thus, 
inclusion of the words "Davis County" in the name of the Clear Air Committee may be 
illegal. 
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expiration of the 30-day appeal period following the Administrative Control Board's 
denial of the Clear Air Committee's appeal. Id. Consequently, under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 42-2-10 (1997), it was barred from filing any action in the trial court within the 
relevant appeal time, and its filing was void. 
Because the filing of the original complaint by the Clear Air Committee 
was void, there was no valid action for which Graham could be substituted as plaintiff. 
At most, his "substitution" signaled the commencement of a wholly new action that 
began with the substitution. The trial court, therefore, erred when it allowed Graham's 
substitution to relate back to the original filing of the complaint by the Clear Air 
Committee. 
Rules 15(c) and 17(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not require 
a different result because neither deal with a situation where the filing of the original 
pleading was void. Indeed, under both it is presumed that the original filing of the 
pleading was otherwise valid. Rule 15(c) allows an amendment to relate back to the 
date of the original filing if the claims made in the amended pleading arose out of the 
same transaction, occurrence, or conduct set forth in the original pleading. Utah R. 
Civ. P. 15(c). If the original pleading is void, however, there is nothing to which the 
amended pleading may relate back. 
Similarly, under Rule 17(a), if an action is commenced in the name of a 
party who is not the real party in interest, the action cannot be dismissed until a 
21 
reasonable time is allowed to substitute or join the real party in interest. Again, 
however, this rule assumes that a valid action was commenced in the first place. 
Furthermore, any substitution of the real party in interest "shall have the 
same effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of the real party in 
interest." Utah R. Civ. P. 17(a). This rule does not even apply here because the 
original complaint in the trial court was filed by and in the name of a real party in 
interest—the Clear Air Committee. The Clear Air Committee was the entity that made 
the records request to the District and appealed the decision to charge for staff time to 
the District's Administrative Control Board. R. 3, 23, 82.6 Thus, it was a real party in 
interest, and there was no need to substitute Graham as the plaintiff to name a different 
real party in interest. 
The only reason substitution was requested was that Graham suddenly 
realized—when the District brought it to his attention in the District's Answer—that the 
Clear Air Committee could not represent itself in court, and that it had not registered 
its name with the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code. Graham did not 
seek substitution because the Clear Air Committee was not a real party in interest. 
Therefore, Graham cannot rely upon Rule 17(a) for his substitution to relate back to the 
date the original complaint was filed. 
6
 The Assumed Name Statute did not preclude the Clear Air Committee 
from participating in administrative proceedings before the District, but it does preclude 
the Clear Air Committee's access to the courts. 
22 
Because the filing of the complaint by the Clear Air Committee was void 
and Graham's substitution as plaintiff at most commenced a new action, the complaint 
should have been dismissed as untimely. The earliest Graham could be considered to 
have been substituted as plaintiff was the date of his motion to amend, September 19, 
1997, which was well beyond the 30-day appeal period allowed under the District's 
GRAMA Ordinance. Ordinance No. 92-C § 11F, Addendum B; see also Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-2-404 (1997) (establishing 30-day time period for appeal from records 
committee decision). The District's Administrative Control Board's decision on the 
Clear Air Committee's appeal was complete no later than July 3, 1997. The Court 
should rule that Graham's amended complaint was untimely and that the trial court 
lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of the case. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT THE DISTRICT COULD 
CHARGE GRAHAM AND THE CLEAR AIR COMMITTEE FOR STAFF 
TIME INCURRED RESPONDING TO THE GRAMA REQUEST 
If the Court concludes that the trial court properly considered the merits 
of this case, the trial court's ruling on the merits should be affirmed. The trial court 
appropriately ruled that the District could charge Graham staff time incurred 
responding to the Clear Air Committee's GRAMA request, even though some of the 
records requested were not transformed from one medium to another. 
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A. A Common Sense Reading of the Plain Language of Section 
63-2-203 Supports the Trial Court's Decision that the District 
Can Charge for Staff Time 
GRAMA reads, in relevant part, that "[e]very person has the right to 
inspect a public record free of charge, and the right to take a copy of a public record 
during normal working hours, subject to Sections 63-2-203 and 63-2-204." Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-2-201(1) (1997) (emphasis added). Thus, the right to inspect records. 
free of charge is expressly made subject to section 63-2-203, which is the section 
allowing a governmental entity to charge fees.7 That sections reads: 
When a governmental entity compiles a record in a form 
other than that normally maintained by the governmental 
entity, the actual costs under this section may include the 
following: 
(a) the cost of staff time for summarizing, 
compiling, or tailoring the record either into an 
organization or media to meet the person's 
request; 
(b) the cost of staff time for search, retrieval, 
and other direct administrative costs for 
complying with a request. . . . 
(c) in the case of fees for a record that is the 
result of computer output other than word 
processing, the actual incremental cost of 
providing the electronic services and products 
7
 Utah's statute is very different from the Minnesota statute and case law 
Graham relies upon. While Utah's statute provides for a right to inspect records free of 
charge, it strikes a balance in an effort to protect public entities and public tax monies 
by authorizing fees in certain circumstances. 
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together with a reasonable portion of the costs 
associated with formatting or interfacing the 
information for particular users, and the 
administrative costs as set forth in Subsections 
(2)(a) and (b). 
Id. § 63-2-203(2) (emphasis added). 
This section further provides that "[t]hose funds shall be used to recover 
the actual cost and expenses incurred by the governmental entity in providing the 
requested record or record series." Id. § 63-2-203(7)(b). This is consistent with public 
records access laws in other jurisdictions. See Hamer v. Lentz, 525 N.E.2d 1045, 1049 
(111. App. Ct. 1988) (citing Family Life League v. Department of Public Aid, 493 
N.E.2d 1054, 1059 (1986)) (finding that "the court may order the payment by plaintiff 
of Nthe reasonable cost of exercising [his] rights.'"); National Treasury Employees 
Union v. Griffin, 811 F.2d 644, 646 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (stating "FOIA generally 
requires requesters to pay the costs of searches"); Merrill v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 
831 P.2d 634, 642-43 (Okla. 1992) (finding Open Records Act permitted Commission 
to charge fees for records request); 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(A). Furthermore, under 
GRAMA " [a] governmental entity may require payment of past fees and future 
estimated fees before beginning to process a request if fees are expected to exceed 
$50, or if the requester has not paid fees from previous requests." Id. § 63-2-203(8) 
(emphasis added). This is all that the District did. 
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Graham argues that the Court should adopt an extremely narrow 
definition of the term "compile." To adopt Graham's proposal, however, would 
completely eviscerate the ability of a political subdivision to recoup costs incurred in 
responding to GRAMA requests. "Compile" is not a defined term under GRAMA. 
However, it is a well-established rule of statutory construction that a term should be 
interpreted and applied in accordance with its usually accepted meaning. Morton Int'l, 
Inc. v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 590 (Utah 1991). 
The term "compile" is defined by Webster's New World Dictionary as "to 
gather and put together (statistics, facts, etc.) in an orderly form" and "to compose (a 
book, etc.) of materials gathered from various sources." Webster's New World 
Dictionary 290 (2d ed. 1980). The term "form" means, inter alia, "the particular mode 
of existence a thing has or takes;" "arrangement; esp. orderly arrangement; way in 
which parts of a whole are organized; pattern; style. . . . " Id. at 548. "Record" is a 
defined term under GRAMA that means: 
all books, letters, documents, papers, maps, plans, 
photographs, films, cards, tapes, recordings, electronic data, 
or other documentary materials regardless of physical form 
or characteristics: (i) which are prepared, owned, received, 
or retained by a governmental entity or political subdivision; 
and (ii) where all of the information in the original is 
reproducible by photocopy or other mechanical or electronic 
means. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-103(18)(a) (1997). 
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Thus, the phrase "compiles a record in a form other than that normally 
maintained" should be construed to mean to gather and put together all books, letters, 
documents, etc. from various sources into an orderly arrangement, but in an 
arrangement different than the records are normally kept in District files. That is 
precisely what the District did. 
This interpretation is consistent with other words used in the same section 
of GRAMA. When meaning cannot be ascertained by using the usual meaning of a 
term, questionable terms or phrases may be "ascertained by reference to words or 
phrases associated with them." Morton, 814 P.2d at 590-91. Here, the words 
surrounding the term "compile" include "summarizing, compiling or tailoring the 
record either into an organization or media to meet the person's request" and "search, 
retrieval, and other direct administrative costs." Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-203(2) 
(1997). 
In this case, the records in question include samples, journals, personal 
field notes, inspection logs, and memos and internal documents concerning stack testing 
and laboratory analyses. Because of the variety of records involved, the District could 
not and did not store them in one document, computer program, or central file. 
R. 240. Moreover, the District had to take raw data and organize it in order to respond 
to Graham's request. Id. 
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The District made a thorough search of all files and records related to the 
testing to ensure that the District produced everything relevant. Id. In doing so, it was 
necessary for the District to contact those people who may have been involved in that 
testing. Id. The District accordingly enlisted the assistance of Jack Schmidt, John 
Watson, Bart Baker, and certain operators and maintenance personnel who spent a total 
of 14 hours searching, retrieving, and compiling the records that Graham requested. 
R. 241. 
The District retrieved and compiled information from District files located 
at individual employees' work stations, day timers, operator logs, testing protocols, 
general District files that may relate to testing, and a computer database. Id. Research 
on the computer database was a time-consuming process. The database is continually 
updated, and after a period of time, information stored in the database is downloaded to 
tape. Some of the information Graham requested had been stored on tape, requiring an 
operator to peruse the computer and tapes to locate and print hard copies of the 
information Graham requested. Id. 
Therefore, to accommodate Graham, it was necessary for the District to 
gather, assemble, collect, accumulate, or amass Graham's specific requests into one 
place or into a new organization, which created a new record. This new organization 
was specifically tailored to meet Graham's request and is in a "form other than that 
normally maintained" by the District. Based on the usual meaning of the term 
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"compile" and taken in the context of the surrounding language in the GRAMA statute, 
the District did "compile[] a record in a form other than that normally maintained by 
the governmental entity." Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-203(2) (1997). 
B. Section 63-2-203 Allows a Charge of Staff Time Even Without a 
Request that Records Be Compiled in a Certain Format 
Graham's argument that section 63-2-203(2) only allows a governmental 
entity to charge a fee for staff time if the requester specifically asks that it be compiled 
in a format different from that maintained by the entity is contrary to the plain language 
of section 63-2-203. That section specifically allows a governmental entity to charge if 
the "governmental entity compiles a record in a form other than that normally 
maintained by the governmental entity. . . . " The section makes no reference to 
allowing fees only when the requester asks for the records to be compiled in a different 
format, it only references how the entity compiles the records. 
Yet, Graham did ask that the records be compiled in a form other than 
that normally maintained by the District. As explained above, by the way his requests 
were structured, the District had to cull through numerous District files and computer 
databases to pull out and compile the records Graham requested. They necessarily 
were put together in a different organization than normally maintained by the District 
because Graham's requests were specifically directed at only certain documents. 
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Therefore, under even Graham's argument, the District would be entitled to charge fees 
for staff time. 
C. The Legislative History Does Not Support Graham's 
Interpretation 
Graham's appeal to the legislative history is similarly unavailing. Graham 
cites statements purportedly made by Senator Steele when the language of section 
63-2-203(2) was amended in 1994. Senator Steele allegedly stated that the language, 
"[w]hen a governmental entity compiles a record in a form other than that normally 
maintained by the governmental entity," means that to qualify under section 
63-2-203(2) the records cannot be compiled in "the exact same form." Aplt. Br. at 13. 
As demonstrated above, using the plain meaning of the words "compile" and "form," 
the records that were retrieved and compiled for Graham were not compiled in "the 
exact same form." The District had to gather, assemble, collect, accumulate, and 
amass Graham's specific requests into one place or into a new organization specifically 
tailored to meet Graham's request. As such, the records as so compiled were in a 
"form other than that normally maintained" by the District. 
Graham also cites to comments by Senator Steele that the amendments 
were intended to have been "taken exactly from the Colorado statute." Aplt. Br. 
App. A at 3 (emphasis added). Yet, as Graham admits, the Colorado statute does not 
use "exactly" the same wording, and as such, regardless of Senator Steele's supposed 
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intent, cannot have the exact same meaning. The Colorado statute Graham cites 
requires the governmental entity to perform "a manipulation of data so as to generate 
a record in a form not used by the state or by said agency." Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 24-72-205(3) (1997) (emphasis added). Nowhere does GRAMA require "a 
manipulation of data" or that a governmental entity put the record "in a form not used 
by the . . . agency." "Manipulating data" into a format entirely foreign to the 
governmental entity is very different from simply compiling a record in a form not 
normally maintained by the governmental entity. Therefore, the Colorado statute does 
not support Graham's position. 
D. Public Policy Favors Protecting Governmental Entities from 
Abusive Records Requests So Long as Public Access Is Not 
Denied 
Graham's public policy argument also fails. Under the District's 
interpretation, broad public access is still available and First Amendment rights are 
protected, but a balance is struck to protect public coffers from abusive requests. 
Records requesters could tie up government operations needlessly if they only have to 
pay staff time for compilation when they specifically ask for the records to be put in 
different media than the records are maintained by governmental entities. 
Governmental entities should be allowed to charge staff time compilation costs to 
protect our tax dollars from abusive requests. Allowing governmental entities to do 
this would not hamper access to records, but would encourage records requesters to 
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draft their requests narrowly so as to not overburden state and local government. 
Records requesters will still have their records, and our local governments will still be 
able to carry out their functions and also protect our tax dollars. 
For simple compilations of records, GRAMA provides its own protection 
of public access because it does not allow governmental entities to charge for the first 
15 minutes of staff time attributable to compiling the record. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-2-203(2)(b) (1997) ("no charge may be made for the first quarter hour of staff 
time").8 Thus, if a search of several different sources or for a single record does not 
take more than 15 minutes, the requester does not have to pay administrative costs. 
The vast majority of GRAMA requests handled by the District fall into this category. 
Yet, if a records request requires complicated searching and retrieval, our tax dollars 
are protected by the requirement that the requester pay certain costs. 
E. The District's GRAMA Ordinance Allows Charging Graham 
for the Staff Time Incurred 
The Utah legislature has authorized each political subdivision to "adopt an 
ordinance or a policy applicable throughout its jurisdiction relating to information 
practices including classification, designation, access, denials, segregation, appeals, 
management, retention, and amendment of records." Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-701 (l)(a) 
(1997). On June 10, 1992, the District adopted Ordinance No. 92-C (the 
8
 The District will not charge Graham for the first 15 minutes it spent 
compiling the records he requested. This will reduce the charge to $275. 
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"Ordinance"), which is a policy that sets forth, among other things, the District's 
response procedures pertinent to a records request as well as the applicable fees. 
Ordinance No. 92-C at 9-11, §§ 9, 10, Addendum B. 
Pursuant to the Ordinance, the District's fee schedule is as follows: 
1. Reviewing a record to determine whether it is subject to 
disclosure . . . No charge 
2. Inspection of record by requesting person . . . No charge 
3. Copy Fees . . . 25 cents per page 
4. Computer Disk . . . $5.00 (Plus overhead and time of District staff 
in preparation of information request billed at the rate of $20.00 
per hour) 
5. Other Forms . . . Actual cost (Minimum $5.00 plus overhead and 
time of District staff in preparation of information request billed at 
the rate of $20.00 per hour.) 
6. Miscellaneous Fees . . . Actual cost (Minimum $5.00 plus 
overhead and time of District staff in preparation of information 
request billed at the rate of $20.00 per hour.) 
Ordinance No. 92-C at 10-11, § 10, Addendum B. 
The fees the District charged Graham are in accordance with GRAMA 
and the Ordinance. Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-203 (1997); Ordinance No. 92-C at 10-11, 
§10. The $280 fee assessed by the District is based on the 14 actual hours expended 
for the several searches by District staff. R. 241. In compliance with GRAMA and the 
District's Ordinance, Graham was not charged for time incurred in reviewing the 
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records to determine whether they were private, controlled, or protected under 
GRAMA, although a review of the records Graham requested was made to make such a 
determination. Id. Graham also will not be charged for inspecting the records, only 
for the retrieval and compilation of the records, as set forth above. 
The fees the District charged Graham were reasonable. Staff time 
charges assessed by the District on Graham's records request were based on the 
Ordinance, but were less than actual costs. Id.; see Merrill v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 
831 P.2d 634, 642-43 (Okla. 1992) (finding charges of $350 for a microfiche copy and 
$258 for a computer tape copy, which included labor and administrative costs, not 
unreasonable under Oklahoma's Open Records Act). Recently, the District paid a 
federal agency $25 per hour for staff time incurred by that agency responding to a 
FOIA request. R. 241. 
The District's charges were proper under GRAMA and the District's 
GRAMA Ordinance. The Court should affirm the trial court on this issue. 
in. 
GRAHAM IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD 
OF ATTORNEY FEES OR COSTS 
GRAMA provides that the Court may, in its discretion, award attorney 
fees and costs incurred in a judicial appeal "of a denial of a records request if the 
requester substantially prevails." Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-802(2)(a) (1997). In making 
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its decision, the Court is required to consider "the public benefit derived from the case; 
the nature of the requester's interest in the records; and whether the governmental 
entity's or political subdivision's actions had a reasonable basis." Id. § 63-2-802(b). 
Because the District, not Graham, is entitled to judgment, Graham is not entitled to the 
fees and costs he seeks. 
If Graham prevails on this appeal, the Court should not order that Graham 
be awarded fees on remand. The trial court's carefully reasoned opinion, agreeing with 
the District's position on the fees charged, demonstrates that the District's actions had 
more than a reasonable basis. The remaining issues that must be addressed to 
determine whether fees should be assessed are factual inquiries that should be left to the 
trial court for determination. See Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 319 (Utah 
1998) (attorney fees for prevailing party on appeal remanded to trial court for 
determination). 
In any event, Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-802(5) (1997) provides that claims 
for attorneys' fees under GRAMA are subject to the provisions of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. Presumably, that means after prevailing, if he does, 
Graham would have to follow the procedural requirements of the Governmental 
Immunity Act before he could be entitled to recover. Such cannot be accomplished 
during the course of this appeal. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Court should rule that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider 
the merits of this case because the filing of the original complaint by the Clear Air 
Committee was void, and the substitution of Graham as plaintiff was untimely. If the 
Court concludes that the trial court properly reached the merits of this case, the Court 
should affirm the trial court's decision on the merits in all respects. 
DATED this 19th day of October, 1998. 
WOOD CRAPO LLC 
Attoi 
Appellees/Cross-Appellants/Defendants 
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Addendum A 
Utah Code Ann. § 42-2-5. Certificate of assumed and of true name - Contents -
Execution - Filing. 
(1) Every person who carries on, conducts, or transacts 
business in this state under an assumed name, whether that 
business is carried on, conducted, or transacted as an 
individual, association, partnership, corporation, or 
otherwise, shall file with the Division of Corporations and 
Commercial Code a certificate setting forth: 
(a) the name under which the business is, or is to be 
carried on, conducted, or transacted, and the full true 
name, or names, of the person owning, and the 
person carrying on, conducting, or transacting the 
business; 
(b) the location of the principal place of business, 
and the street address of the person. 
(2) The certificate shall be executed by the person owning, 
and the person carrying on, conducting, or transacting the 
business, and shall be filed not later than 30 days after the 
time of commencing to carry on, conduct, or transact the 
business. 
(3) "Filed" means the Division of Corporations and 
Commercial Code has received and approved, as to form, a 
document submitted under the provisions of this chapter, 
and has marked on the face of the document a stamp or seal 
indicating the time of day and date of approval, the name of 
the division, the division director's signature and division 
seal, or facsimiles of the signature or seal. 
Utah Code Ann. § 42-2-10. Penalties. 
Any person who carries on, conducts, or transacts business 
under an assumed name without having complied with the 
provisions of this chapter, and until the provisions of this 
chapter are complied with: 
(1) shall not sue, prosecute, or maintain any action, 
suit, counterclaim, cross complaint, or proceeding in 
any of the courts of this state; and 
(2) may be subject to a penalty in the form of a late 
filing fee determined by the division director in an 
amount not to exceed three times the fees charged 
under Section 42-2-7 and established under Section 
63-38-3.2. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-201. Right to inspect records and receive copies of records. 
(1) Every person has the right to inspect a public record 
free of charge, and the right to take a copy of a public 
record during normal working hours, subject to Sections 
63-2-203 and 63-2-204. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-203. Fees. 
(2) When a governmental entity compiles a record in a form 
other than that normally maintained by the governmental 
entity, the actual costs under this section may include the 
following: 
(a) the cost of staff time for summarizing, compiling, 
or tailoring the record either into an organization or 
media to meet the person's request; 
(b) the cost of staff time for search, retrieval, and 
other direct administrative costs for complying with a 
request. The hourly charge may not exceed the salary 
of the lowest paid employee who, in the discretion of 
the custodian of records, has the necessary skill and 
training to perform the request; provided, however, 
that no charge may be made for the first quarter hour 
of staff time; and 
(c) in the case of fees for a record that is the 
result of computer output other than word 
processing, the actual incremental cost of 
providing the electronic services and products 
together with a reasonable portion of the costs 
associated with formatting or interfacing the 
information for particular users, and the 
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administrative costs as set forth in Subsections 
(2)(a) and (b). 
(7)(b) Those funds shall be used to recover the actual cost 
and expenses incurred by the governmental entity in 
providing the requested record or record series. 
(8) A governmental entity may require payment of past fees 
and future estimated fees before beginning to process a 
request if fees are expected to exceed $50, or if the 
requester has not paid fees from previous requests. Any 
prepaid amount in excess of fees due shall be returned to the 
requester. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-802. Injunction - Attorneys1 fees. 
(2)(a) A district court may assess against any governmental 
entity or political subdivision reasonable attorneys' fees and 
other litigation costs reasonably incurred in connection with 
a judicial appeal of a denial of a records request if the 
requester substantially prevails. 
(b) In determining whether to award attorneys' fees under 
this section, the court shall consider: 
(i) the public benefit derived from the case; 
(ii) the nature of the requester's interest in the 
records; and 
(iii) whether the governmental entity's or political 
subdivision's actions had a reasonable basis. 
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(c) Attorneys' fees shall not ordinarily be awarded if the 
purpose of the litigation is primarily to benefit the 
requester's financial or commercial interest. 
(3) Neither attorneys' fees nor costs shall be awarded for 
fees or costs incurred during administrative proceedings. 
(4) Notwithstanding Subsection (2), a court may only award 
fees and costs incurred in connection with appeals to district 
courts under Subsection 63-2-404(2) if the fees and costs 
were incurred 20 or more days after the requester provided 
to the governmental entity or political subdivision a 
statement of position that adequately explains the basis for 
the requester's position. 
(5) Claims for attorneys' fees as provided in this section or 
for damages are subject to Title 63, Chapter 30, 
Governmental Immunity Act. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-40. Corporations and associations forbidden to practice -
Exceptions. 
It shall be unlawful for any corporation or voluntary 
association, except such as are organized for benevolent or 
charitable purposes, or organizations approved by the 
Supreme Court and formed for the purpose of assisting 
persons without means in the pursuit of civil remedies, to 
hold itself out to the public by advertisement or otherwise as 
being entitled to practice law or to furnish attorneys or 
counselors, or to render legal services or advice of any kind 
in any action or proceeding, or to solicit directly or 
indirectly any claim or demand for the purpose of bringing 
action thereon. Any corporation or voluntary association 
violating any of the provisions of this section is liable to a 
fine of not more than $5,000; and every officer, agent or 
employee of such corporation or voluntary association who 
directly or indirectly engages on behalf of such corporation 
or voluntary association in any of the acts herein prohibited, 
or assists such corporation or voluntary association to do 
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such prohibited acts, is guilty of a misdemeanor. The fact 
that such officer, agent or employee is a duly and regularly 
licensed attorney at law shall not be held to permit or allow 
any such corporation or voluntary association to do the acts 
prohibited herein, nor shall such fact be a defense upon the 
trial of any of the persons mentioned herein for a violation 
of the provisions of this section. 
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Rule 15, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Amended and supplemental pleadings. 
(c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense 
asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or 
occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, 
the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading. 
Rule 17, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure- Parties plaintiff and defendant. 
(a) Real party in interest. Every action shall be prosecuted in the name 
of the real party in interest. An executor, administrator, guardian, bailee, 
trustee of an express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a 
contract has been made for the benefit of another, or a party authorized 
by statute may sue in that person's name without joining the party for 
whose benefit the action is brought; and when a statute so provides, an 
action for the use or benefit of another shall be brought in the name of the 
state of Utah. No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not 
prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time 
has been allowed after objection for ratification of commencement of the 
action by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest; and such 
ratification, joinder, or substitution shall have the same effect as if the 
action had been commenced in the name of the real party in interest. 
7 
Addendum B 
X I N 6 & KING 
LAwrm 
251 IAST 2W TWIT* 
f. 0 .»OI32 f 
l. UTAH MQ1S 
STO/TOOlgl 
ORDINANCE NO. 92-C 
AN ORDINANCE ADOPTING A POLICY RELATING 
TO INFORMATION PRACTICES INCLUDING 
CLASSIFICATION, DESIGNATION, ACCESS, 
DENIALS, SEGREGATION, APPEALS, 
MANAGEMENT, RETENTION AND AMENDMENT OF 
RECORDS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS 
OF THE UTAH "GOVERNMENT RECORDS ACCESS 
AND MANAGEMENT ACT" AND PROVIDING FOR AN 
EFFECTIVE DATE. 
STTMM1HT rrP ORDINANCE 
This Ordinance adopts a policy relating to information 
practices including classification, designation, access, 
denials, segregation, appeals, management, retention and 
amendment of records in accordance with provisions of the Utah 
Government Records Access and management Act" and provides for 
an effective date for such Ordinance. 
DATED this ir* day of June, 1992. 
DAVIS COUNTY SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT 
AND ENERGY RECOVERY SPECIAL SERVICE 
DISTRICT 
By: 
ROBERT W. ARBUCKLE 
Chairman 
Administrative Control Board 
ATTEST: 
GAYLE A. STEVENSON 
Secretary 
Date of Publ icat ion: 
BiGraxnaSumm 
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ORDINANCE HO- 92-C 
AN ORDINANCE ADOPTING A POLICY RELATING 
TO INFORMATION PRACTICES INCLUDING 
CLASSIFICATION, DESIGNATION, ACCESS, 
DENIALS, SEGREGATION, APPEALS, 
MANAGEMENT, RETENTION AND AMENDMENT OF 
RECORDS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS 
OF THE UTAH "GOVERNMENT RECORDS ACCESS 
AND MANAGEMENT ACT" AND PROVIDING FOR AN 
EFFECTIVE DATE. 
WHEREAS, the Utah State Legislature has adopted the 
"Government Records Access and Management Act", hereinafter 
sometimes referred to as "GRAMA" or the "Act"; and, 
WHEREAS, it is the intent of GRAMA, inter alia, to 
establish fair and reasonable records management practices in 
accordance with the requirements of said Act; and, 
WHEREAS, GRAMA permits each political subdivision to 
adopt a policy relating to information practices subject to 
the requirements of the said Act; and/ 
WHEREAS, the Davis County Solid Waste Management and 
Energy Recovery Special Service District (District) does now 
find that it is both necessary and desirable to adopt fair and 
reasonable records management practices for the District in 
accordance with and as required by the said Act, 
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
CONTROL BOARD OF THE DAVIS COUNTY SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT AND 
ENERGY RECOVERY SPECIAL SERVICE DISTRICT, a public body of the 
State of Utah, as follows, to-wit: 
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Section 1 - General Purpose 
A. The Davis County Solid Waste Management 
and Energy Recovery Special Service 
District (hereinafter sometimes referred 
to as the "District") adopts this policy 
to establish guidelines for open 
government information recognizing the 
need to maintain and preserve accurate 
records, provide public access to public 
records and preserve the right of privacy 
of personal data collected or received by 
the District. 
Section 2 - District Policy 
A. In adopting this policy# the District 
recognizes the enactment of Government 
Records Access and Management Act by the 
Utah State Legislature (Sections 63-2-101 
et seq,, Utah Code Annotated, 1953) and 
the application of that Act to the 
District records. The purpose of these 
policies is to conform to Section 63-2-
701 which provides that each political 
subdivision may adopt an ordinance or a 
policy relating to information practices 
including classification, designation, 
access, denials, segregation, appeals, 
management, retention and amendment of 
records. The intent of this policy is to 
provide modifications to the general 
provisions of State law, where allowed, 
to meet the public needs, operation, 
management capabilities and resources of 
the District, 
Section 3 - Compliance with State Law 
A. in adopting this policy, the District 
recognizes the following sections of the 
Government Records Access and Management 
Act apply to the District and adopts by 
reference such provisions as part of this 
policy. Any inconsistency or conflict 
between this policy and the following 
referenced statutes, where discretion is 
not allowed by the statute, shall be 
governed by the statute• 
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Part 1 General Provisions 
S63-2-101 Short title 
§63-2-102 Legislative intent 
§63-2-103 Definitions 
S63-2-104 Administrative Procedures 
Act not applicable 
§63-2-105 Confidentiality 
agreements 
Part 2 Access to Records 
S63-2-201 Right to inspect records 
and receive copies of 
563-2-202 Access to private, 
controlled and protected 
documents 
§63-2-205 Denials 
S63-2-206 Sharing records 
Part 3 Classification 
§63-2-301 Records that must be 
disclosed 
SS3-2-302 Private records 
§63-2-303 Controlled records 
S63-2-304 Protected records 
S63-2-305 Procedure to determine 
classification 
S63-2-306 Duty to evaluate records 
and make designations and 
classifications 
§63-2-307 Segregation of records 
S63-2-308 Business confidentiality 
claims 
Part 4 [NOT APPLICABLE] 
Part 5 [NOT APPLICABLE] 
Part: 6 Accuracy of Records 
S63-2-601 Rights of individuals on 
whom data is maintained 
§63-2-602 Disclosure to subject of 
records - Context of use 
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Part 7 Applicability to Political Subdivisions: 
The Judiciary and the Legislature 
Part 8 
S63-2-701 
Remedies 
§63-2-801 
§63-2-802 
S63-2-803 
Political subdivisions to 
enact ordinances in 
compliance with chapter 
Criminal penalties 
Injunction - Attorneys' 
Pees 
No l i a b i l i t y for certain 
d e c i s i o n s o f a 
governmental entity 
Disciplinary action 
Part 9 
S63-2-804 
Archives and Records Service 
S63-2-905 
S63-2-907 
Records declared property 
of the State -
Right to replevin 
Part 10 Other 
SS3-30-1G.6 Attorneysr fees 
records request 
for 
Section 4 - Definitions 
As used in this ordinance, the following definitions 
shall be applicable. 
A. "Act" shall refer to the Government Records Access 
and Management Act, SS63-2-1, et seq., Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
B. "District" shall refer to the Davis County Solid 
Waste Management and Energy Recovery Special 
Service District. 
C. "Computer software program" means the series of 
instructions or statements that permit the 
functioning of a computer system in a manner 
designed to provide storage, . retrieval, and 
manipulation of data from the computer system, and 
any associated documentation, manuals, or other 
source material eacplaining how to operate the 
software program. "Software" does not include the 
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original data or record which is manipulated by the 
software, 
"Controlled" records shall be those defined as 
controlled under the provisions of the Act, 
"Data" shall refer to individual entries (for 
example, birth date, address, etc.) in records. 
"Dispose" means to destroy, or render irretrievable 
or illegible, a record or the information contained 
in it by any physical, electronic, or other means, 
including unauthorized deletion or erasure of 
electronically recorded audio, visual, non-written 
formats, data processing, or other records• 
"Non-public" records shall refer to those records 
defined as private, controlled, or protected under 
the provisions of the Act. 
•'Private" records shall refer to those records 
classified as private under the provisions of the 
Act. 
"Protected" records shall refer to those records 
classified as protected under the provisions of the 
Act. 
"Public" records shall refer to those records which 
have not been classified as non-public in 
accordance with the provisions of the Act. 
(1) "Record" means all books, letters, documents, 
papers, maps, plans, photographs, films, cards, 
tapes, recordings, or other documentary materials, 
and electronic data regardless of physical form or 
characteristics, prepared, owned, used, received, 
or retained by the District where all the 
information in the original is reproducible by some 
mechanical, electronic, photographic or other 
means. 
(2) "Record" does not mean: 
(a) Temporary drafts or similar materials 
prepared for the originator's personal 
use or prepared by the originator for the 
personal use of a person for whom he is 
working; 
5 
OMSOa «•«-«- 9\-IS * 9KIH ZLZZ CtS 1 0 8 © 6C:CT C6/6 
(b) Materials that are legally owned by an 
individual in his private capacity; 
(c) Materials to which access is limited by 
the laws of copyright or patent; 
(d) Junk mail or commercial publications 
received by the District or by an officer 
or employee of the District; 
(e) Personal notes or daily calendars 
prepared by any District employee for 
personal use or the personal use of a 
supervisor or such notes, calendars or 
internal memoranda prepared for the use 
of an officer or agency acting in a 
quasi-judicial or deliberative process or 
pursuant to matters discussed in a 
meeting closed pursuant to Utah Open 
Meetings Act; or 
(f) Proprietary computer software programs as 
defined in subsection C. above that are 
developed or purchased by or for the 
District for its own use. 
Section 5 - Public Right to Records 
A* Members of the public shall have the right to see, 
review, examine and take copies, in any format 
maintained by the District, of all District 
governmental records defined as "public" under the 
provisions of this Policy, upon the payment of the 
lawful fee and pursuant to the provisions of this 
Policy and the Act. 
B. The District has no obligation to create a record 
or record series in response to a request from a 
member of the public, if the record requested is 
not otherwise regularly maintained or kept. 
C. When a record is temporarily held by a custodial 
District agency, pursuant to that custodial 
agency's statutory functions, such as records 
storage, investigation, litigation or audit, the 
record shall not be considered a record of the 
custodial agency for the purposes of this Policy. 
The record shall be considered a record of the 
District and any requests for access to such 
6 
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records shall be directed to the District, rather 
than the custodial agency, pursuant to these 
procedures. 
D. Original documents shall not leave the custody of 
the District. Document inspection will occur in 
the conference area of the administrative office 
building or such other area designated by the 
Records Officer. Private citizens will not be 
allowed in the vault where original documents are 
maintained. The appropriate documents and/or files 
given to the individual will be accounted for 
subsequent to the individual's inspection and prior 
to his/her departure from the District offices. 
Section 6 - Public, Private, Controlled and Protected 
Records 
A. Public records shall be all those District records 
that are not private, controlled, or protected and 
that are not exempt from disclosure as provided in 
subsection 63-2-201(3)(b) of the Act- Public 
records shall be made available to any person. All 
District records are considered public unless they 
are (1) expressly designated, classified, or 
defined otherwise by the District in accordance 
with policies and procedures established by this 
Policy, (2) are so designated, classified or 
defined by the Act, or (3) are made non-public by 
other applicable law. 
B. Private records shall be those District records 
classified as "private", as defined in the Act S63-
2-302 (U.C.A., 1953, as amended) and as designated, 
classified, or defined in procedures established 
pursuant to this Policy* Private records shall be 
made available to the following persons: The 
subject of the record, the parent or legal guardian 
of a minor who ia the subject of the record, the 
legal guardian of an incapacitated individual who 
is the subject of the record, any person who has a 
power of attorney or a notarized release from the 
subject of the record or his legal representative, 
or any person possessed of and serving a 
legislative subpoena or a court order issued by a 
court of competent jurisdiction. 
C. Controlled records shall be those District records 
classified as "controlled", as defined in the Act, 
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§63-2-303 (U.C.A., 1953, as amended) and as 
designated, classified, or defined in procedures 
established in this Policy, Controlled records 
shall be made available to a physician, 
psychologist, or licensed social worker who submits 
a notarized release from the subject of the record 
or any person presenting a legislative subpoena or 
a court order issued by a court of competent 
j uris diction. 
D« Protected records shall be those District records 
classified as "protected" as defined in the Act, 
§63-2-304 (U.C.A,, 1953, as amended) and as 
designated, classified or defined in procedures 
established in this Policy. Protected records 
shall be made available to the person who submitted 
the information in the record, to a person who has 
power of attorney or notarized release from any 
persons or governmental entities whose interests 
are protected by the classification of the record, 
or to any person presenting a legislative subpoena 
or a court order regarding the release of the 
information and issued by a court or competent 
jurisdiction. 
Section 7 - Privacy Rights 
A. The District recognizes and upholds the personal 
right of privacy retained by persons who may be the 
subject of governmental records. 
B. The District may, as determined appropriate by the 
District Executive Director, notify the subject of 
a record that a request for access to the subject's 
record has been made. 
C. The District may require that the requester of 
records provide a written release, notarized within 
thirty (30) days before the request, from the 
subject of the records in question before access to 
such records is provided. 
Section B - Designation, Classification and Retention 
A* All District records and records series, of any 
format, shall be designated, classified and 
scheduled for retention according to the provisions 
of the Act and this Policy. Any records or record 
series generated in the future shall also be so 
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designated, classified and scheduled for retention. 
Records designation classification and scheduling 
for retention shall be conducted under the 
supervision of the District Executive Director. 
Section 9 - Procedures for Records Request 
A. Under circumstances in which a District is not able 
to respond immediately to a records request, the 
requester shall fill out and present to the 
District a written request on forms provided by the 
District. The date and time of the request shall 
be noted on the written request form and all time 
frames provided under this Policy shall commence 
from that time and date. Requesters of non-public 
information shall adequately identify themselves 
and their status prior to receiving access to non-
public records. 
B. The District may respond to a request for a record 
by approving the request and providing the records, 
denying the request, or such other appropriate 
response as may be established by policies and 
procedures. 
C. (1) In most circumstances and excepting those 
eventualities set out below, the District shall 
respond to a written request for a public record 
within ten business days "after that request. 
(2) Extraordinary circumstances shall justify the 
District's failure to respond to a written request 
for a public record within ten business days and 
shall extend the time for response thereto to that 
time reasonably necessary to respond to the 
request, as determined by the District Executive 
Director. Extraordinary circumstances shall 
include/ but not be limited to, the following: 
(a) Some other governmental entity is currently 
and actively using the record requested; 
(b) The record requested is for either a 
voluminous quantity of records or requires the 
District to review a large jiumber of records 
or perform extensive research to locate the 
materials requested; 
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(c) The District is currently processing either a 
large number of records requests or is subject 
to extraordinary work loads in the processing 
of other work; 
(d) The request involves an analysis of legal 
issues to determine the proper response to the 
request; 
(e) The request involves extensive editing to 
separate public data in a record from that 
data which is not public; or 
(f) Providing the information request requires 
computer programming or other format 
manipulation • 
(3) When a record request cannot be responded to 
within ten (10) business days, the District Records 
Officer shall give the requester an estimate of the 
time required to respond to the request. Such 
estimate may be given at any time within the ten 
(10) day period* 
D. The failure or inability of the District to respond 
to a request for a record within the time frames 
set out herein, or the District's denial of such a 
request, shall give the requester the right to 
appeal as provided in Section 11. 
Section 10 - Fees 
A. Applicable fees for the processing of information 
requests under this Policy shall generally be set 
at actual cost or as otherwise established by 
policies adopted under this Policy, The District 
will charge the following fees for requests 
relating to the Government Records Access and 
Management Act. 
1. Reviewing a record to determine 
whether it is subject to disclosure No charge 
2. Inspection of record by 
requesting person • No charge 
3. Copy Fees 25 cents per page 
10 
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4. ComputerDisk. .. • • ....$5.00 
(P lus overhead and 
time of District staff in 
preparation of information 
request billed at the rate 
of $20.00 per hour) 
5 . Other Forms Actual cost 
(Minimum $5.00 plus 
overhead and time of 
District staff in 
preparation of information 
request billed at the rate 
of $20.00 per hour.) 
6. Miscellaneous Fees Actual cost 
(Minimum $5.00 plus 
overhead and time of 
District staff in 
preparation of information 
request billed at the rate 
of $20,00 per hour.) 
Section 11 - Appeal Process 
A. Any person aggrieved by the District's denial or 
claim of extraordinary circumstances may appeal the 
determination within thirty calendar (30) days 
after notice of the District's action to the 
District Executive Director by filing a written 
notice of appeal. The notice of appeal shall 
contain the petitioner's name, address, phone 
number, relief sought and if petitioner desires, a 
short statement of the facts, reasons and legal 
authority for the appeal. 
B. If the appeal involves a record that is subject to 
business confidentiality or affects the privacy 
rights of an individual or person, the District 
Executive Director shall send a notice of the 
requester's appeal to the affected individual or 
person. 
C. The District Executive Director shall make a 
determination on the appeal within thirty b\ siness 
(30) days after receipt of the appeal. During this 
30 day period the District Executive Director may 
schedule an informal hearing or request any 
additional information deemed necessary to make a 
determination. The District Executive Director 
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shall send written notice to the appellant and any 
affected person or individual providing the reasons 
for the District Executive Director's 
determination. 
D. In addition, if the District Executive Director 
affirms the denial in whole or in part, the denial 
shall include a statement that the requester has a 
right to appeal the denial to the District's 
Administrative Control Board within thirty (30) 
calendar days. 
E, The person may file a written notice of appeal to 
the Administrative Control Board to be heard at the 
next scheduled meeting of the Board, If there is 
no meeting scheduled in the next thirty (30) 
calendar days the Administrative Control Board 
shall schedule a special meeting for the purpose of 
hearing the appeal. The final decision of the 
Administrative Control Board shall be by majority 
vote of a quorum of the Board. The Board shall 
prepare a written decision outlining its final 
determination and reasons for the final 
determination. 
P. If the Administrative Control Board affirms the 
denial, in whole or in partf the person may 
petition for judicial review in District Court as 
provided in S63-2-404, U.C.A., 1953. 
Section 12 - Reasonable Accommodation 
A. Reasonable accommodations regarding access to 
governmental records shall be provided to persons 
with disabilities in accordance with the Americans 
with Disabilities Act upon request of the 
applicant. 
Section 13 - Records Amendments 
A, Government records held by the District may be 
amended or corrected as needed. Requests for 
amendments, corrections, or other changes shall be 
made in writing to the District having custody of 
the records and setting forth, wirn specificity, 
the amendment or correction requested. When an 
amendment or correction of a government record is 
made, both the original record and the amended or 
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corrected record shall be retained, unless provided 
otherwise by the Act or other State or Federal law. 
Section 14 - Penalties 
A. District employees who knowingly refuse to permit 
access to records in accordance with the Act and 
this Policy, who knowingly permit access to non-
public records, or who knowingly, without 
authorization or legal authority, dispose of, 
alter, or remove records or allow other persons to 
do so in violation of the provisions of the Act, 
this Policy or other law or regulation may be 
subject to criminal prosecution in accordance'with 
the Act and disciplinary action, including 
termination of employment, 
B. In accordance with the Act, neither the District 
nor any of its officers or employees shall be 
liable for damages resulting from the release of a 
record where the requester presented evidence of 
authority to obtain the record, even if it may be 
subsequently determined that the requester had no 
such authority. 
Section 15 - Records Officer 
A, The District Office Secretary is appointed to 
coordinate records access, management and archives 
activities and shall make annual reports of records 
services activities to the Executive Director who 
shall make an annual report of such activities to 
the Administrative Control Board. 
Section 16 - Records Maintenance 
A. Records maintenance procedures shall be developed 
to ensure that due care is taken to maintain and 
preserve District records safely and accurately 
over the long term. The District Executive 
Director shall be responsible for monitoring the 
application and use of technical processes in the 
creation, duplication, and disposal of District 
records. He/she shall monitor compliance with 
required standards of quality, . permanence, and 
admissibility pertaining to the creation, use, and 
maintenance of records. 
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B. All District records shall remain the property of 
the District unless federal or state legal 
authority provides otherwise. Property rights to 
District records may not be permanently transferred 
from the District to any private individual or 
entity, including those legally disposable obsolete 
District records. This prohibition does not 
include the providing of copies of District records 
otherwise produced for release or distribution 
under this chapter. 
C. Custodians of any District records shallf at the 
expiration of their terms of office, appointment or 
employment, deliver custody and control of all 
records kept or received by them to their 
successors, supervisors/ or to the District 
Executive Director* 
Section 17 - Effective Date 
This Ordinance shall become effective July 1, 1992 
provided that prior to such time a copy of this Ordinance 
shall be deposited in the District Offices and a short Summary 
published in a newspaper published within the District. 
PASSED AND ADOPTED this IVtf* day of June, 1992, 
DAVIS COUNTY SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT 
AND ENERGY RECOVERY SPECIAL SERVICE 
DISTRICT 
By: —-TUyJi KV^Kjy/?, 
ROBERT W. ARBUCKLE 
Chairman 
ATTEST: 
GAYLE 
Secre tary 
B:GramaOrd 
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS CQUNTYL1 - , P i >Q7 
STATE OF UTAH l'uv l 0 4 l o ' : l Ji 
MARK E. GRAHAM, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DAVIS COUNTY SOLID WASTE 
MANAGEMENT AND ENERGY 
RECOVERY SPECIAL SERVICE 
DISTRICT, THE DISTRICTS 
ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL BOARD, 
and LEGRAND BITTER, THE DISTRICTS 
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 
Defendants. 
>JtfUl_ 
RULING ON PLAINTIFFS 
MOTION TO AMEND and 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS 
OR FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 970700320 
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs and Defendants1 respective Notices to 
Submit on their (respective) motions. The Court has reviewed the parties' pleadings, as well 
as the applicable law on the issues raised in those pleadings. Having done so, and now being 
fully advised, the Court hereby rules as follows: 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Motion to Amend 
Utah Rules of Civ. Pro. Rule 15(a) states in full: 
Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any 
time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which no 
responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial 
calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is served. 
Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written 
consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so 
requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended pleading within the time 
remaining for response to the original pleading or within 10 days after service of 
the amended pleading, whichever period may be the longer, unless the court 
otherwise orders. 
Pursuant to these rules, after the time for an amended pleading of right has passed, 
there are only two ways that an amendment to a pleading may be made: by leave of court, or 
by written consent of the other party. There was no consent by the other party, so the only 
way that this amended pleading may be allowed in would be by leave of court. The Utah 
Supreme Court, while recognizing such matters are within the sound discretion of the trial 
court, stated that "Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure tends to favor the granting of 
leave to amend" Westlev v. Farmers Ins. Exch.. 663 P.2d 93, 94 (Utah 1983). 
Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment 
Defendants' motion to dismiss seeks dismissal based on evidence outside of the 
pleadings. Once matters outside the pleadings are presented to the Court and are not 
excluded by the Court, the motion is properly treated as one for summary judgment. Lind v. 
Lynck 665 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1983) [quoting Rule 12(b)(6)]. 
Accordingly, in light of the foregoing the Court notes that summary judgment is 
appropriate "only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Beynon v. St. George-Dixie Lodge # 1743. 854 
P.2d 513, 514-515 (Utah 1993): see also Alf v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co.. 850 P.2d 1272, 
1274 (Utah 1993). Moreover, in considering a motion for summary judgement, the Court 
must examine the evidence in "a light most favorable to the party opposing summary 
judgment." Hunt v. Hurst 785 P.2d 414, 415 (Utah 1990). 
Procedural History 
A brief recital of the procedural history of this case is necessary to frame the Court's 
substantive ruling: 
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1. That this action was initially brought in the name of "Residents of Davis 
County Clear Air Committee, a non-profit organization (the "Committee") on July 30, 1997. 
Mark E. Graham ("Graham") lists himself as the individual actually filing the complaint, 
purporting to represent the committee in a pro-se capacity; 
2. That plaintiff Graham, on September 19, 1997, moved the Court to allow 
amendment of the complaint, such amendment substituting Graham's name in place of the 
Committee as plaintiff. The motion was accompanied by a ?rNotice of Motion for Leave tcr 
File Amended Complaint, the proposed Amended Complaint, and an order granting leave to 
amend the complaint. The motion encompassed a certificate of service to counsel for 
defendants, and the ,fNotice of Motion" also apparently sought to apprise defendants of 
plaintiffs pending motion to amend; 
3. That no response having being filed within the 10-day statutory period, the 
Court's clerk inadvertently placed the motion to amend before the Court for decision 
September 29, 1997. At that time, there had been no notice to submit filed, as required by 
Rule 4-501, Utah Code of Judicial Administration. The Court, believing the motion to have 
been properly submitted and no objection having been received at that juncture, signed 
plaintiffs order granting him leave to amend October 3, 1997; 
4. The same day, October 3, 1997, defendants filed their (current) motion to 
dismiss or for summary judgment, supported by a "Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs 
Motion to File an Amended Complaint and in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or 
for Summary Judgment; 
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5. That on October 14, 1997 plaintiff Graham filed with the Court a notice to 
submit on the motion to amend, which notice stated "the motion to file an amended complaint 
is fully briefed, including the attached memorandum filed on this date, and is ready for 
decision." Also filed by plaintiff Graham that same day were his "Memorandum in Support 
of Plaintiffs Motion to File an Amended Complaint, and in Opposition to Defendants' Motion 
to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment;" his "Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment" (referencing the other memorandum filed that 
day); and his "Motion to Remand Case to District's Executive Director With Instructions." 
6. That on October 27, 1997 defendants filed with the Court their "Reply 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to File an Amended Complaint and in 
Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment. 
LFGAL ARGUMENTS AND RULING 
In this action, plaintiff requests judicial review of the defendants' decision to require 
payment before release of records sought under GRAMA1 Plaintiffs Committee and Graham 
sought release of records involving air pollution release tests from defendants. Apparently, 
defendants prepared the requested records, but will not allow review or release of the records 
until such time as plaintiffs) pay the requested fees. The issue before the Court at present 
however, is plaintiffs) capacity to bring this suit at all. Essentially, defendants argue that the 
action must be dismissed and Graham must not be allowed to be substituted as plaintiff in an 
amended complaint because: 1. The initial filing of the lawsuit is void because Graham, a 
1
 As far as the Court can tell by the pleadings submitted, this already somewhat 
protracted (and probably expensive) litigation stems entirely from defendants1 $280.00 request. 
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non-attorney, filed the suit in a representative capacity on behalf of the Committee; 2. The 
initial filing of the lawsuit in the name of the Committee is void because the Committee 
failed to comply with the Utah Assumed Name Statutes (especially UCA § 42-2-10); 3. The 
Committee, as the entity having administratively dealt with defendants, is the only proper 
party-plaintiff; and 4. Even if Graham were substituted as plaintiff, his claims do not relate 
back, and as such they are now time-barred 
With respect to the defendants' arguments, the Court finds: 
Pro-Se Representation 
It is clear that in Utah, a non-attorney may not represent anyone but him/her self in a 
court of law. Tracy-Burke v. Dept. of Employment Security. 699 P.2d 687, 688 (1985) (per 
curiam) fquoting Turtle v. Hi-Land Dairyman's Association. 10 Utah 2d 195, 350 P.2d 616 
(I960)). (See also, UCA § 78-51-25) In filing this case, Graham, a non-attorney, attempted 
to represent the Committee in a pro-se capacity. Defendants argue that doing so rendered the 
filing of this lawsuit void ab initio. As support, they cite a California case, Paradise v. 
NowlirL2 which held that an appellate brief filed by an individual representing a corporation 
in propria persona was void and without effect. The Tracy-Burke case, although it cites 
language from Paradise, does not, as defendants argue, stand for the proposition that this 
lawsuit is void ab initio. It simply held that the petition for review must be dismissed, as it 
stood in front of that Court, because of the improper representation. The issue of whether the 
initial filing of the petition was void was not addressed in that case, and has never been 
2
 195 P.2d 867 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948). 
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addressed by Utah's appellate courts. It is this Court's opinion that the circumstances of this 
case, in that plaintiff timely requested an amendment to conform with the rules as soon as he 
was notified of the error, would argue against dismissal on such grounds. 
Violation of Utah's Assumed Name Statutes 
UCA § 42-2-10 states, in relevant part, that: 
Any person who carries on, conducts, or transacts business under an 
assumed name without having complied with the provisions of this chapter, and 
until the provisions of this chapter are complied with: 
(1) shall not sue, prosecute, or maintain any action, suit, 
counterclaim, cross complaint, or proceeding in any of the courts 
of this state; and 
The Court is not entirely convinced that a community association allegedly organized 
for the purposes of monitoring pollution compliance is carrying on, conducting, or transacting 
business such to put it within the purview of the above-cited statute. A search of Utah cases 
reveals little on the issue that would be helpful to the Court. Nevertheless, even assuming 
defendants' position to be meritorious on this point, the Courts position with respect to the 
pro-se representation issue would apply equally to this issue to preclude dismissal. Plaintiffs 
timely request to amend the complaint would serve to remedy any error that may have arisen 
as a result of its filing under an improperly registered assumed name. 
Committee Only Proper Party-Plaintiff 
On this issue, the Court finds that there are disputed issues of fact precluding 
summary judgment It is plainly apparent from the filed communications between the parties 
that even defendants themselves were somewhat confused as to whether they were dealing 
with the Committee or with Graham. Mich, if not all, of the correspondence from defendants 
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concerning the underlying issue in this case is addressed to Graham, in his personal capacity, 
rather than to the Committee. Such correspondence is often, but apparently not on every 
occasion, in response to Graham's correspondence stating that he was acting in behalf of the 
Committee. 
The Court finds (below) that there is no evidence that there is not an identity of 
interest between Graham and the Committee. Furthermore, in none of the communications 
between the parties was there ever (as far as the evidence before the Court shows) an issue 
raised by defendants as to whether Graham or the Committee were administratively 
proceeding in an improper manner. Such findings, if unrebutted by further evidence, would 
surely raise substantial issues of estoppel against defendants1 use of this argument. 
No Relation Back 
Rule 15(c), U.RCiv.P. reads as follows: 
Relation back of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the 
amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or 
attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to 
the date of the original pleading. 
Utah Courts have had various occasions to interpret this language, and the most 
common feeling among the Courts, with respect to the substitution or addition of new parties, 
is that the parties sought to be substituted or added must have an "identity of interest" with 
the originally named parties. See, e.g., Wilcox, 911 P.2 367 (Utah 1996); Vina v. Jefferson 
Ins. Co.. 761 P.2d 581 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Peny v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co.. 681 
P.2d 214, 217 (Utah 1984); and Doxey-Lavton Co. v. Clark. 548 P.2d 902, 906 (Utah 1976). 
The general rule relating to the application of Rule 15(c) was set forth in Doxey-LaytorL 548 
P.2dat906. The Utah Supreme Court stated: 
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Generally Rule 15(c), U.R.C.P., will not apply to an amendment which 
substitutes or adds new parties for those brought before the court by the 
original pleadings - whether plaintiff or defendant. This for the reason that 
such would amount to the assertion of a new cause of action, and if such were 
allowed to relate back to the filing of the complaint, the purpose of a statute of 
limitation would be defeated. 
There is an exception to the is rule. The exception operates where there 
is a relation back, as to both plaintiff and defendant, when new and old parties 
have an identity of interest; so it can assumed or proved the relation back is 
not prejudicial. The rational underpinning this exception is one which obstructs 
a mechanical use of the statute of limitations: to prevent adjudication of a 
claim. Such is particularly valid where, as here, the real parties in interest 
were sufficiently alerted to the proceedings, or were involved in them 
unofficially, from an early stage. 
Id., at 906. (emphasis added). Defendants vigorously attempt to show that there is no 
identity of interest between the Committee and Graham. Such arguments hardly persuade the 
Court. As set forth above, there is no evidence in front of the Court that Graham's interests 
in this matter are not substantially the same, if not identical, to those of the Committee. On 
the other hand, there is ample evidence that "the real parties in interest were sufficiently 
alerted to the proceedings, or were involved in them unofficially, from an early stage," 
weighing in favor of relation back.3 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the above findings and conclusions of law, the Court finds that, in the 
interests of justice, and with the policies of Rule 15 in mind, that plaintiff Graham's Motion 
to Amend should be granted and his claims shall be allowed to relate back to the time of the 
filing of the action. 
3
 Id. Doxey-LaytoiL as well as the majority of cases in this area, deal with the 
substitution of defendants, rather than plaintifis. Nevertheless, the policies in those cases 
apply equally to cases such as this. 
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Conversely, the Court finds that defendants have not met their burden with respect to 
any of their arguments on their Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment. 
Therefore, plaintiffs Motion to Amend is HEREBY GRANTED and defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment is HEREBY DENIED. 
As the prior order of the Court (of October 3, 1997) granting plaintiff leave to amend 
was entered before the matter was ripe for decision, it is hereby withdrawn. 
Dated November 1% , 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
JON M MEMMOTT 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling on Ortpber 
1997, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Larry S. Jenkins 
Susan J. Mueller 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Mark Graham, Pro Se 
2211 East 1200 North 
Layton,Utah 84040 
]Am^ 
ies E. Merrell 
Law Clerk to the 
Honorable Jon M Memmott 
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Addendum D 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF D/fi^S eOl^I^Pi i 'S3 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARK GRAHAM, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DAVIS COUNTY SOLID WASTE 
MANAGEMENT AND ENERGY 
RECOVERY SPECIAL SERVICE 
DISTRICT, THE DISTRICTS 
ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL BOARD, 
and LeGRAND BITTER, THE DISTRICT'S 
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 
Defendants. 
:.-. „' Y\(jLs 
RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S AND 
DEFENDANTS' CROSS MOTIONS 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 970700320 
The matters of plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and defendants' cross-motion for 
summary judgment come before the Court for decision on the parties' respective notices to 
submit. The Court has reviewed both parties' pleadings and other submitted materials, as well as 
the applicable law. Having done so, and now being fully advised, it is the Court's conclusion that 
plaintiffs motion for summary judgment should be denied and defendants' motion for summary 
judgment should be granted. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Court finds no dispute as to the following relevant material facts:1 
1. That defendant Davis County Solid Waste Management and Energy Recovery 
Special Service District ("District") is a political subdivision of the State of Utah and a 
"governmental entity" pursuant to U.C.A. § 63-2-103(9); 
1
 The Court has taken the following facts from the parties' memoranda in support and opposition of 
their respective motions. Plaintiffs facts are not supported by any reference to the record, but as defendant raises 
no objection and does not dispute such facts, the Court will allow them. Plaintiff disputes several of defendant's 
(properly supported) facts, but only on legal grounds which the Court dismisses and as to their relevancy, not their 
truthfulness or accuracy. Furthermore, plaintiff provides no reference to any record which would put their 
truthfulness at issue. 
2. That defendant Administrative Control Board ("Board") is the governing body of 
the district, and has the legal authority to make determinations regarding public access to records 
in the district's offices and agencies. The Board is also a "governmental entity" pursuant to 
U.C.A. § 63-2-103(9); 
3. That defendant Bitter is and was at also times relevant to this action the executive 
director of the District. The Executive Director's office is a "governmental entity" pursuant to 
U.C.A. § 63-2-103(9); 
4. That in February and April of 1997, the District performed initial compliance 
testing as required by condition no. 8 of the Approval Order Number DAQE-850-96 dated 
September 10, 1996 ("Approval Order") issued by the State of Utah Department of 
Environmental Quality, Division of Air Quality; 
5. That on April 28,1997 plaintiff submitted a written request to the District 
pursuant to U.C.A. § 63-2-101 etseq. of the Utah Government Records access and Management 
Act ("GRAMA") for the right to inspect as well as copy certain governmental records 
concerning the 1997 stack tests; 
6. That the written request asked for: 
1. The current contract(s) between the Special Service District and Dr. H. Gregor Rigo 
and/or his firm, Rigo & Rigo Associates; 
2. Records relating to the stack test(s) conducted during January and/or February, 1997, 
namely: 
a. samples taken, journals, personal field notes, and inspection logs; 
b. laboratory analysis of air samples taken; 
c. any correspondence between the District and the entities responsible for 
gathering and/or analyzing and evaluating the air samples subsequent to the date of 
sampling; 
d. memos or internal documents (within the Special Service District) relating 
to the stack test or the laboratory analysis; 
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e. any deviation or departure from the prescribed methods for gathering; 
samples and their reason(s), or problems encountered during the sample gathering 
process. 
7. That on May 7, 1997 the District responded to plaintiff in writing. The letter said, 
in relevant part ,". . . copies will not be made until further request is made by you," and went on 
to say, "Staff time and overhead will be billed at $20.00 per hour for compilation of the 
documents; 
8. That on May 22, 1997 plaintiff wrote to the District asking the District to set a 
date between May 27 and June 10 (but excluding June 4) for inspection of the requested 
government records; 
9. That on May 29, 1997 the District sent plaintiff some of the material requested, 
specifically, the District's contract with Rigo and Rigo Associates; 
10. That on June 4, 1997 the District responded in writing by stating its intention to 
charge the plaintiff $280.00 for staff time before allowing plaintiff to either inspect or copy the 
requested material; 
11. That on June 9,1997 plaintiff appealed the District's denial to Bitter, the 
District's executive director, pursuant to the District's Ordinance 92-C, which is in accordance 
with GRAMA; 
12. That on June 24, 1997 Bitter responded in writing, denying the appeal; 
13. That on July 2, 1997 plaintiff appealed Bitter's decision to the Board at its 
monthly meeting; 
14. That on July 2, 1997 the Board voted to deny plaintiffs appeal, sending written 
notice of that vote the next day; 
15. That the District has never claimed that the government records requested by 
plaintiff are private, controlled or protected, or that plaintiff has no right to inspect such records; 
16. That this action was filed July 30, 1997; 
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17. That because of the variety of records involved in accommodating Mr. Graham's 
request, the District could not and did not store them in one document, computer program, or 
central file; 
18. That the District had to take files, documents, and data from several sources and 
organize them in order to respond to Mr. Graham's request; 
19. That the district made a thorough search of all files and records related to the 
testing to insure that the District produced everything relevant; 
20. That in order to do so, it was necessary for the District to contact those people 
who may have been involved in the testing at issue and obtain their assistance; 
21. That John Watson, Bart Baker, certain operators and maintenance personnel, and 
Jack Schmidt searched, retrieved, and compiled the records requested by Mr. Graham. 
Collectively, they spent a total of 14 hours; 
22. That the District retrieved and compiled information from District files located at 
individual employees' work stations, daytimers, operator logs, testing protocols, general District 
files that may relate to testing, and a computer database; 
23. That research on the computer database was a time-consuming process. The 
database is continually updated, and after a period of time, information stored in the database is 
downloaded to tape. Some of the information Mr. Graham requested had been stored on tape, 
requiring an operator to peruse the computer and tapes to locate and print hard copies of the 
information plaintiff requested; 
24. That the district assessed plaintiff a $280.00 fee based on the 14 hours actually 
expended for the several searches by the District staff; 
25. That in compliance with GRAMA and the Ordinance, plaintiff will not be charged 
for time incurred in reviewing the records to determine whether they were private, controlled or 
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protected under GRAMA, although a review of the records requested by plaintiff was made to 
make such a determination; 
26. That staff time charges assessed by the District on plaintiffs records request were 
based on the Ordinance, but were less than actual cost because employees who reviewed the files 
are paid more than $20.00 per hour; 
27. That recently, the District was charged $25.00 per hour for staff time incurred by 
Hill Air Force Base in responding to Freedom of Information Act request by the District. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Before turning to the merits of the case, the Court notes the applicable standard of review. 
Summary judgment is appropriate "only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Bevnon v. St. George-Dixie Lodge # 
1743, 854 P.2d 513, 514-515 (Utah 1993): see also Alf v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co.. 850 P.2d 
1272, 1274 (Utah 1993). 
In considering a motion for summary judgement, the Court must examine the evidence in 
"a light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment." Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414, 
415 (Utah 1990). Allegations or denials in the pleadings are not a sufficient basis for opposing 
summary judgment, see Hall v. Fitzgerald, 671 P.2d 224 (Utah 1983), and when a motion for 
summary judgment is filed and supported by an affidavit or affidavits, the party opposing the 
motion has an affirmative duty to respond with affidavits or other materials allowed by Rule 
56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See D & L Supply v. Saurini. 775 P.2d 420 (Utah 
1989); Thavne v. Beneficial Utah Inc., 874 P.2d 120 (Utah 1994). Rule 4-501 (2)(b) of the Utah 
Code of Judicial Administration states: 
(b) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and authorities in 
opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that 
contains a concise statement of material facts as to which the party contends a 
genuine issue exists. Each disputed fact shall be stated in separate numbered 
sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of the record upon which 
the opposing party relies, and, if applicable, shall state the numbered sentence or 
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sentences of the movant's facts that are disputed. AH material facts set forth in the 
movant's statement and properly supported bv an accurate reference to the record 
shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless 
specifically controverted bv the opposing party's statement. 
(emphasis added) 
LEGAL ARGUMENTS AND RULING 
Upon competing motions for summary judgment, there appear to be few disputed facts 
between the parties. Plaintiff, in his reply memo, well characterizes the essential dispute 
between the parties as concerning the interpretation and application of GRAMA statutes, 
specifically U.C.A. § 63-2-203(2), to the facts of this case. U.C.A. § 63-2-203(2) reads as 
follows: 
(2) When a governmental entity compiles a record in a form other than that 
normally maintained by the governmental entity, the actual costs under this section 
may include the following: 
(a) the cost of staff time for summarizing, compiling, or tailoring the 
record either into an organization or media to meet the person's request; 
(b) the cost of staff time for search, retrieval, and other direct 
administrative costs for complying with a request. The hourly charge may not 
exceed the salary of the lowest paid employee who, in the discretion of the 
custodian of records, has the necessary skill and training to perform the 
request; provided, however, that no charge may be made for the first quarter 
hour of staff time; and 
(c) in the case of fees for a record that is the result of 
computer output other than word processing, the actual incremental 
cost of providing the electronic services and products together with 
a reasonable portion of the costs associated with formatting or 
interfacing the information for particular users, and the administrative 
costs as set forth in Subsections (2)(a) and (b). 
Defendants argue that the $280.00 fee they request is provided for by the statute. Plaintiff argues 
it is not. The parties are before the Court, requesting the Court resolve their dispute. 
Plaintiffs critical argument revolves around the meaning of the words "compile" and 
"form" and their context, in the phrase: "When a governmental entity compiles a record in a form 
other than that normally maintained by the governmental entity, the actual costs under this 
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section may include the following: [.]" Plaintiff argues that the meanings of "compile" and 
"form" are vague and ambiguous and as such must be construed as narrowly as possible, thereby 
excluding all charges for any records that are already maintained by the government agency, and 
only allowing charges for a record that is "transformed" into a different record. Defendants 
argue that the fees they are charging are allowable under the plain reading of the statute. 
The Utah Supreme Court has expressed guidelines on statutory construction as follows: 
The applicable principles of statutory construction are clear. "We look first to the 
plain language of the statute to discern the legislative intent 'Only when we find 
ambiguity in the statute's plain language need we seek guidance from the legislative 
history and relevant policy consideration.'" 
Citv of South Salt Lake v. Salt Lake County, 925 P.2d 954, 957 (Utah 1996). Furthermore, 
Indeed, it is a "fundamental principle of statutory construction (and.. . of language 
itself) that the meaning of a word cannot be determined in isolation, but must be 
drawn from the context in which it is used." 
State v. Hunt. 906 P.2d 311,313 (Utah 1995). Finally, "[w]e must assume that each term in the 
statute was used advisedly by the Legislature and that each should be interpreted and applied 
according to its usually accepted meaning." West Jordan v. Morrison. 656 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah 
1982). 
In the Court's opinion, the statute is neither vague nor ambiguous, nor is it difficult to 
construct, given the plain meaning of its terms. Defendants provide that Webster's New World 
Dictionary defines "compile" as: "to gather and put together (statistics, facts, etc.) in an orderly 
form" and "to compose (a book, etc.) of materials gathered from various sources." Webster's 
defines "form," inter alia, as: "the particular mode of existence a thing has or takes;" 
"arrangement, esp. orderly arrangement; way in which parts of a whole are organized; pattern; 
style.. ."2 
2
 Webster's New World Dictionary, (2d ed. 1980) 290, and 548, respectively. By coincidence, the 
Court uses the same dictionary, and has reviewed these citations for accuracy. 
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Plaintiffs request consists of records falling into five separate categories (see, Court's 
Findings of Fact No. 6, a-e, supra). Defendants' unrebutted evidence, from the affidavit of John 
K. Schmidt submitted in support of their memorandum, shows that 14 hours of staff time was 
spent in responding to plaintiffs request (see, Court's Findings of Fact Nos. 17-23, supra). 
From the facts submitted it is quite clear to the Court that the requested fee was incurred as a 
direct result of the District's "summarizing, compiling [and] tailoring the record either into an 
organization or media to meet the person's request;" their "search, retrieval, and other direct 
administrative costs for complying with [the] request; and "the actual incremental cost of 
providing the electronic services and products together with a reasonable portion of the costs 
associated with formatting or interfacing the information for particular users, and the 
administrative costs as set forth in Subsections (2)(a) and (b)." [See U.C.A. § 63-2-203(2)(a)-(c).] 
Plaintiff argues that the District should have been able to respond to his requests by 
simply retrieving the records and presenting them to him, yet does not support these allegations 
by evidence acceptable under Rule 56, U.R.Civ.P.3 As made clear by defendants, the records 
were kept in neither the form nor the media requested by plaintiff and they therefore needed to be 
"compiled" into that form to conform to his requests. 
The Court finds that the common meaning of the terms "compile" and "form"would 
include the work performed by the District. As further support, the context of the words within 
the statute supports this conclusion. "Compile" is the only verb in U.C.A. § 63-2-203(2) 
defining what actual costs may be charged for. Therefore, as the same section goes on to state 
"the actual costs under this section may include the following...," any of the tasks listed at 63-2-
203(2)(a) through (c) must, by necessity, be encompassed within the term "compile." Any other 
3
 Plaintiffs comment with respect to the storage capacity of Iomega "Zip" data storage drives is 
neither supported by evidence, nor relevant. Defendants supported averment is that the data had to be pulled from 
several sources, and that old files were constantly being put on computer storage tapes, necessitating the time for 
perusing such files to find and copy the relevant requested material. 
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reading of the section would be nonsensical, and, in the Court's opinion, could only with great 
difficulty be seriously argued. 
Plaintiff does not dispute the actual number of staff hours worked nor the rate charged. 
As such, the Court would find both reasonable under the statute as well as in the Court's 
experience. In sum, the Court finds defendant's facts and arguments persuasive, and would 
award summary judgement in their favor. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing reasons, the Court rules that plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment is HEREBY DENIED. Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is 
HEREBY GRANTED. 
No attorneys' fees are awarded. 
Dated April J n _ , 1998. 
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